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DEVELOPING A PREDICTIVE MODEL OF SOFTWARE
PIRACY BEHAVIOR:  AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
A. Graham Peace
Duquesne University
Dennis F. Galletta
University of Pittsburgh
Abstract
There is, perhaps, no more visible financial dilemma in the software industry today than that of software
piracy.  In this paper, we detail the development and empirical validation of a predictive model of software
piracy behavior by computer-using professionals.  The model was developed from the results of prior
research in software piracy and the reference disciplines of the theory of planned behavior, expected utility
theory and deterrence theory.   The study utilized two methods to analyze the piracy decision.  A survey was
used to test the entire model and an experiment was undertaken to test several relationships between the
included variables.  The results indicate that the identified factors have a significant impact on the decision
to pirate software and that the model is a useful tool in further understanding this behavior.  The results add
to a growing stream of MIS research into piracy behavior and have significant implications for organizations
and industry groups aiming to reduce piracy behavior.
1. INTRODUCTION
Although legislation and enforcement mechanisms have been developed, software industry estimates indicate that the practice
of software piracy is widespread and costs software manufacturers billions of dollars annually (Business Software Alliance
1994; Greenberger 1996).  Reducing the problem of piracy is a goal of several industry groups and developing a valid model
of piracy behavior is an important step in achieving this goal (Sims, Cheng and Teegen 1996).  This study continues a recent
stream of MIS research aimed at developing such a model.
2. THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
Much of the initial research into software piracy consisted of surveys measuring the attitudes and practices of students and
professionals.  Shim and Taylor surveyed both business faculty and managers in a pair of studies in 1988 and 1989.  It was
found that 90% of business faculty believed that their colleagues copied software illegally and over 50% of managers indicated
that they had committed software piracy.  The surveys also found that younger managers were more prone to practice software
piracy than their older counterparts.  This is a trend that runs throughout the literature and indicates that the practice may
increase in frequency as these managers replace the older generation.  Oz (1990), Paradice (1990), Solomon and O’Brien (1990)
and Kievit (1991) all found similar results when studying student populations.  Oz reached the disturbing conclusion that
“young professionals have no scruples about copying software illegally” (1990, p.26).  Paradice concluded that it was especially
important for MIS managers to make their new employees specifically aware of the departments’ ethical corporate policies.
In more recent work, Sims, Cheng and Teegen found that males pirated software more frequently than females and younger
students were more likely to pirate software than older students.
Perhaps the most comprehensive work toward developing a complete model of software piracy behavior has been done by Anne
Christensen and Martha Eining (Eining and Christensen 1991; Christensen and Eining 1991, 1993). Their most recent model
utilizes the theory of reasoned action, deterrence theory and equity theory to develop the model presented in Figure 1.  The
model was tested empirically, explained 36% of the variance in piracy behavior, and found that positive piracy attitudes are
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indicative of a propensity to copy software illegally.  Also, those piracy attitudes are predicted by an individual’s perceptions
of authority figures’ approval or disapproval of software piracy.  Software prices were not found to be related to piracy
attitudes, but individuals with positive attitudes toward computers were found to be more likely to have a positive attitude
toward piracy (Christensen and Eining 1993). The initial model posited that the perception of peer norms would influence the
individual’s piracy attitudes.  However, empirical evidence supported an assertion in the opposite direction, as indicated in
Figure 1; the individual’s attitude toward software piracy affected his or her perception of the peer group’s norms.  This result
has been directly contradicted by the research of Watson and Pitt (1993) who studied possible determinants of behavior toward
ethical issues in personal computing.  Watson and Pitt found that the perception of management’s beliefs influenced peers’
behaviors which, in turn, influenced the behavior of the individual.
Figure 1.  Software Piracy Model (Christensen and Eining 1993)
Gopal and Sanders (1992) theorized that deterrent measures could be used to increase software manufacturer profits by
dissuading individuals from pirating software, and found empirical evidence to support their theory.  They also determined that
preventive measures such as anti-copying devices actually reduced profits.
2.1 The Theory of Planned Behavior
A stream of research in social psychology suggests that a person’s behavioral intention toward a specific behavior is a factor
in whether or not that individual will carry out that behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein 1977).  Behavioral
intention is, in turn, predicted by the individual’s attitude toward the behavior and subjective norms.  This is referred to as the
theory of reasoned action (TRA).  Much support has been found for the predictive ability of this theory (Sheppard, Hartwick
and Warshaw 1988).  The theory of planned behavior (TPB) was developed when the factor of perceived behavioral control
(PBC) was added to TRA (Ajzen 1991).  TPB posits that behavior is determined by the intention to perform the behavior, which
is predicted by three factors: attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms, and PBC (Ajzen 1991; Beck and Ajzen 1991).
PBC refers to the perception of the subject as to his or her ability and opportunity to commit the behavior.  PBC is also
theorized to have a direct effect on actual behavior.
Much research has been done to validate TPB empirically.  Ajzen, alone, lists sixteen studies utilizing the construct, almost
all of which found significant supportive evidence.  While the original model of TPB posited interaction effects between the
factors, research has only revealed the existence of main effects (Beck and Ajzen 1991).
The relative importance of attitude, subjective norms, and PBC can be expected to vary across situations (Ajzen 1991; Beck
and Ajzen 1991).  Consequently, it is useful to examine each specific behavior (such as software piracy) and the significance
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of each factor in predicting the behavior.  For example, PBC was found to be a leading factor in the decision to cheat on an
exam and shoplift (Beck and Ajzen 1991), whereas attitude was found to be more important in the decision to lose weight
(Schifter and Ajzen 1985) and in the decision to use information technology (Taylor and Todd 1995).  While attitude has been
shown to be a factor in piracy behavior (Christensen and Eining 1993), the role of PBC has yet to be studied.
2.2 Expected Utility Theory
Economic issues such as costs and benefits are also commonly claimed to be factors in a person’s decision-making process.
For example, availability of financial resources has been cited as a reason for software piracy behavior (e.g. Solomon and
O’Brien 1990).  Expected utility theory (EUT) posits that, when faced with choices among risky prospects with outcome vectors
x  and with associated probabilities p  such that 3p =1, then a rational, self-interested individual will attempt to maximizei        ii
3F(p )U(x ), where F(p ) is some function of the probability and U(x ) is the utility function of the possible outcomes.  Whilei i i i
different variants of this model exist, the underlying idea is that the individual will choose the course of action that maximizes
his or her expected utility (Schoemaker 1982).
Computer-using professionals have three possible courses of action when faced with a situation in which software can be used:
purchase the software, do without the software, or pirate the software.  It is possible to describe these choices in terms of EUT.
In order to do so, it is necessary to determine the costs and benefits involved.
It is assumed in this work that a benefit is gained from the use of software (i.e., a reduction in the amount of effort needed to
complete the task at hand).  Consequently, a rational, self-interested computer-user will always either purchase the software
in question or pirate it.
A purchase cost is involved if the software is legally obtained.  It is assumed in this study that the purchase cost is less than
the benefit gained from the use of the software.  The expected utility of purchasing the software is the expected benefit gained
from the use of the software, less the expected cost of the software.
In the case of software piracy, costs result not from purchasing the software but from the punishment level and the probability
that the punishment will be incurred.  The expected utility of pirating is the expected benefit gained from pirating (the purchase
cost) less the expected cost (calculated using the punishment probability and punishment level).  The individual will pirate the
software when the expected utility of pirating is greater than the expected utility of not pirating.
2.3 Deterrence Theory
The discussion of expected costs with respect to punishment levels and probability of punishment is closely linked to deterrence
theory.  Ehrlich (1973), for example, found that the rate of some felonies is positively related to estimated gains and negatively
related to expected costs.  The study also found that crime rates are related to income inequality.  Straub (1990) found that
deterrent measures are a useful primary strategy for reducing computer abuse.  These findings have a direct bearing on the
software piracy discussion.
The punishment probability factor and the punishment level factor described above are referred to in the deterrence theory
literature as punishment certainty and punishment severity, respectively (e.g., Tittle 1980).  As with EUT, deterrence theory
proposes that, as these factors are increased, the level of illegal behavior should decrease.  Ehrlich directly related this theory
to economic factors and found that many crimes against property are related to the expected gains of the crime versus the
expected costs at the margin, much as is proposed in the previous section.
Not only does deterrence theory relate to the punishment level and probability in the software piracy scenario, but also to the
cost.  Ehrlich’s work indicates that a strong correlation exists between income inequality and crimes against property.  This
may be due to the fact that those with less income perceive more potential gain from illegally obtaining property than those
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for whom the cost of obtaining the property legally is relatively lower.  In the case of software, the lower the cost of the
software package, the less the gain if it is pirated.
A factor not taken into account by TPB or EUT but that may be relevant in cases of dishonest activity is that of moral
obligation (Beck and Ajzen 1991).  Developed from deterrence theory,  moral obligation posits that people have personal
feelings of a moral nature that influence their actions.  These feelings of guilt are a form of control over a person’s actions and
inhibit unethical behavior (Grasmick and Scott 1982).   The guilty feelings are a self-imposed punishment, inflicted when the
behavior of actors contradicts their moral commitment (Grasmick and Scott 1982).
2.4 The Predictive Model
Each of the theories discussed above provides valuable insight into the process behind the piracy behavior of the individual
and the factors involved.  Using TPB as a framework, this paper integrates these factors into a comprehensive predictive model
of piracy behavior.  TPB posits that belief outcomes feed into the predicting factors.  In the case of attitude, Ajzen posits that
behavioral beliefs lead to attitude toward a behavior.  These beliefs link the behavior to a certain outcome.  The more positive
the outcome, as perceived by the individual, the more positive the individual’s attitude toward that behavior.  In the case of
piracy, EUT and deterrence theory can be used to identify factors that affect the possible outcomes of the behavior of piracy.
The probability of punishment (punishment certainty), the level of punishment (punishment severity), and the cost of the
software (s/w cost) are all variables that directly relate to the expected outcome.  Therefore, it is posited that each of these
factors affects the attitude of the individual toward piracy behavior (attitude).  The moral obligation factor is also associated
with the costs and benefits of committing the action.  As previously stated, guilt is a form of self-inflicted punishment incurred
when an individual commits an action that he or she perceives as going against his or her moral obligations.  Therefore, the
model incorporates the factor of moral obligation as a predictor of attitude.
Christensen and Eining (1993) posited that attitude toward computers would have an inverse effect on the individual’s attitude
toward piracy (due to the respect that the individual would have for the work that goes into computer programming).  However,
those authors found the exact opposite result.  Individuals with positive attitudes toward computers were found to have positive
attitudes toward piracy.  Due to this finding, attitude toward computers is included in the model as a predictor of attitude.
However, it should be noted that this factor was not included in the final statistical analysis due to validity problems (detailed
below) with the measuring instrument.
Figure 2.  Predictive Model of Piracy Behavior
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PBC is determined by control beliefs (Ajzen 1991).  These control beliefs relate to the individual’s perceptions of the resources
and opportunities necessary to commit the act.  In the case of piracy, a limiting factor on the ability to commit piracy
successfully is the probability of detection.  It is assumed that detection of the piracy will lead to the piracy action being halted.
Therefore, perception of probability of detection (punishment certainty) is predicted to be a control belief affecting the
individual’s PBC.
3. RESEARCH METHOD
To enhance the validity of the results, the model and the relationships between the factors involved were tested using two
methods: a survey and a quasi-experiment.
3.1 Questionnaire Development
The questionnaire was an important data gathering instrument in both the survey and the experiment.  No previously tested
questionnaire was available for gathering information on attitude, subjective norms, PBC, moral obligation and piracy
intention.  However, surveys have been carried out with the aim of gaining measures of some of these factors regarding similar
dishonest behaviors.  Beck and Ajzen utilized questionnaires to test the applicability of  using TPB in predicting subjects’
dishonest behavior in the areas of cheating on exams, lying and shoplifting.  Using this instrument as a base, a similar set of
questions was developed for this study.  In each case, the original questions were adapted by replacing the dishonest behavior
identified in the existing question with the term “software piracy.”
The Attitudes Toward Computer Usage Scale (ATCUS) questionnaire (Popovich et al. 1987) was also used.  This instrument
utilizes twenty questions to measure a person’s attitude toward computers.  The scale, proving to be valid and useful in previous
work (Brown, Brown and Baack 1988), has been employed several times successfully (Barrier and Margavio 1993).  However,
validity problems were found in the present study, leading to the exclusion of the ATCUS results from analysis.
No previously existing set of questions could be identified to measure the subject’s perception of the punishment certainty for
committing software piracy, punishment severity or software cost.  Therefore, questions were developed to measure these
factors.  The questions did not ask the respondent to give specific figures for these items but, instead, attempted to gauge
whether the subject felt the items were high or low.  Specific figures are not important in this study, as one number may be
perceived as high by one individual and/or low by another.
Two questions were developed to measure the subject’s actual piracy behavior.  One question asked the respondent to self
report the number of times per year (on average) the subject committed software piracy, while a second question asked the
respondent to report the frequency of past piracy behavior (e.g., once per week, once per month, once per year).  Each question
utilized a five point Likert scale.  In the final study, the answers to these questions were very highly correlated (r=.80, p
<.0005).  A measure of piracy behavior for the individual was found by taking the mean of these two items.
The questionnaire was extensively tested for validity.  While the use of previously developed constructs and questionnaire items
aids in creating a valid instrument, it does not, in itself, ensure validity (Straub 1989).  As suggested by Cronbach (1971), an
iterative review process was undertaken to maximize content validity.  The questionnaire was also pilot tested using 38
subjects, resulting in minor changes.
Using the data gathered in the study, discriminant validity was tested by studying each item’s correlation with other items in
its factor and comparing these to correlations with items from other factors.  A violation was considered to have occurred when
a correlation with an item in another factor was higher than a correlation with an item in the factor.  The results were acceptable
for all factors with the exception of the ATCUS items, which had a violation rate of over 30%.  In all factors, inter-item
correlations were significant and large, indicating high convergent validity.  However, the ATCUS items demonstrated only
sporadic inter-item correlations of a high and significant nature.  Internal consistency was tested using Cronbach’s alpha.  The
calculated alphas were all above the generally accepted level of .8 with two exceptions: attitude toward computers (.70) and
PBC (.73).
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Due to the validity problems found with the ATCUS questionnaire, this factor was removed from the model for the purposes
of statistical analysis.
3.2 The Experiment
A modified lab market was used in the experiment.  Subjects were randomly assigned to sessions from a sample of part-time
graduate students at three universities in a U.S. metropolitan area.  Almost all of these individuals held full-time jobs that
involved the use of computers.  In each session, six subjects were asked to role-play as computer-using professionals in
organizations that produced “widgets.”  The sessions were divided into twenty  time periods.  In each time period, the subject’s
organization produced one widget that was to be sold on the open market.  The subject was allowed to set the price for his or
her widget at any level he or she desired.  However, only the five lowest-priced widgets were sold.  The organization unable
to sell its widget in that time period lost the widget and the cost of producing it.  The five organizations that sold their widgets
had the income (the sale price) added to their running balance.  In effect, a quasi-widget market was created in which the
experimental controller purchased widgets produced by the subjects.  To reduce timing strategies, the subjects were not made
aware of the actual number of time periods in the session.
To produce the widget, the subjects were given the option to purchase software in that time period, to not use any software,
or to pirate the software.  Purchasing the software involved a cost (the software cost).  Pirating the software involved no cost,
but did involve the probability of detection and the assessment of a financial fine if the piracy was caught.  The subjects were
made aware of both the punishment certainty and the punishment severity.  In all cases involving the software, there was a
benefit gained from the use of the software: the cost for producing the widget was reduced due to the increased productivity
gained.
A running balance was kept for each subject.  In each time period, the subject was charged a set amount for producing the
widget.  If the subject sold the widget, that income was added to his or her balance.  If the subject purchased the software, the
production costs were reduced by a set amount and the subject was charged for the software.  The software cost was always
less than the benefit gained.  If the subject pirated the software, there was no software cost incurred, but the benefit from
software usage reduced the cost of producing the widget.
At the end of the time period, a random number generator was used to determine if any subjects were audited by the authorities.
If a subject was audited and had pirated the software, a financial fine was incurred and subtracted from the subject’s running
balance.  At the end of the session, the subject with the highest total was financially rewarded, as were those subjects who
finished with a profit.
By manipulating the variables (s/w cost, punishment severity, and punishment certainty) and monitoring the decision to pirate
or not pirate, it was possible to test several of the relationships predicted by the model.  Each variable was tested at two levels,
making it necessary to create eight (2x2x2) experimental treatments to ensure that all combinations were tested.  The values
utilized in the experiment are shown in Table 1.  These values were carefully chosen to ensure that perfectly rational behavior
Table 1.  Experiment Variable Values
Variable Value 1 Value 2
S/W Cost $10 $30
Punishment Certainty 5% 50%
Punishment Severity $50 $250
Variable Value
Cost to Make One Widget $100
Reduction in Cost From Software Usage $40
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would predict that software piracy would occur in four of the scenarios and purchasing would occur in the other four.  It is
important to note that the questionnaire used in the survey was also used in the experiment to gather data on the other relevant
variables.  The questionnaire was administered after the subjects had completed the experiment.
The experiment was run in a computer lab using software written by the first author.  Using the designed interface, each subject
entered the decisions (i.e. purchase software, pirate software, set widget price, etc.) at his or her own terminal.  The software
recorded the subjects’ choices in each session.  A central computer was used to display the running balance for each subject,
visible to all subjects on a projection screen.  The software also randomly selected subjects for audit in each time period (using
the prespecified punishment probability for the session) and assessed fines automatically when pirates were caught.  Audit and
punishment data were displayed on the selected subjects’ terminals when they were audited.
4. SURVEY RESULTS
sample was taken from a population of part-time students taking evening classes in the MBA program of a mid-Atlantic U.S.
university.  The survey was anonymous and confidential (although the subjects were informed that group totals may be
released).   Of the 264 questionnaires distributed, 203 usable surveys were returned, yielding a usable response rate of 76.9%.
For the questions involving actual piracy behavior, it was necessary to eliminate those individuals who had never had the
opportunity to commit piracy.  The subjects were asked to self-report whether or not they had ever had the opportunity to
commit piracy.  Those that claimed to have never had the opportunity were not included in any analysis involving piracy
behavior.  A total of 174 (65.9% of the total) usable questionnaires were returned from individuals claiming to have had the
opportunity to copy software illegally.
Table 2.  Survey Data Correlation Analyses
First Variable Second Variable r r N2
Moral Obligation Attitude .7995* .6392 203
Punishment Severity Attitude -.2907* .0845 203
S/W Cost Attitude .2274* .0517 203
Punishment Certainty Attitude -.3675* .1351 203
Punishment Certainty PBC -.6407* .4105 203
Attitude Piracy Intention .8029* .6446 203
Subjective Norms Piracy Intention .6829* .4664 203
PBC Piracy Intention .7113* .5059 203
PBC Piracy Behavior .5997* .3596 174
Piracy Intention Piracy Behavior .5850* .3422 174
* p<.001
As an initial test, correlation analyses were undertaken for each of the pairs of variables connected in the research model (see
Table 2).  In all cases, the correlation coefficients were significant at the p<.001 level.  Most of the calculated correlation
coefficients were relatively large, indicating a strong relationship between the variables.  The direction of all relationships was
as expected.
The model was also tested using LISREL® 7 (SPSS 1993).  The fit statistics indicate a good fit to the data ( c  = 573.6,2
p<.0005; AGFI=.754; RMSR=.103).  The model explained 86.7% of the variance in attitude, 78.6% of the variance in PBC,
84% of the variance in piracy intention, and 62.3% of the variance in piracy behavior.  Table 3 summarizes the statistics.
Figure 3 provides the calculated path coefficients for the model.
Moral
Obligation
Punishment
Severity
S/W Cost
Punishment
Certainty
PBC
Subjective
Norms
Attitude
Piracy
Intention
Piracy
Behavior
.936*
.024
.000
-.007
-.887*
.527*
.124
.432*
.477*
.369*
* p<.01
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5. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
Subjects for the experiment were obtained from a sample of part-time graduate students.  Almost all of the subjects worked
full-time as computer-using professionals.
In each session, 120 (6 x 20) decisions to pirate or not pirate were made.  Table 4 lists the number of pro-piracy decisions (out
of 120) made in each treatment.  In all, 298 (31% of total) decisions to pirate and 662 (69% of total) decisions to not pirate were
made.
Figure 3. Path Coefficients For Piracy Behavior Model  (Survey Data)
Table 3.  Fit Statistics for Piracy Model
degrees of freedom 304
c 573.62
goodness of fit .802
adjusted goodness of fit .754
root mean square residual .103
attitude r .8672
PBC r .7862
piracy intention r .8402
piracy behavior r .6232
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Table 4.  Frequency of Decisions to Pirate in Each Scenario
Software Cost = $10
Punishment Severity
Punishment Certainty $50 $250
.05 38 (31.7%) 26 (21.7%)
.50 39 (32.5%) 13 (10.8%)
Software Cost = $30
Punishment Severity
Punishment Certainty $50 $250
.05 77 (64.2%) 39 (32.5%)
.50 58 (48.3%) 8 (6.7%)
Data were collected for each decision made in the experiment (i.e., the decision to pirate or not pirate by each subject in each
time period).  The variable pirate was set to 0 when a decision to not pirate was made and 1 when a decision to pirate was
made.  Data were then grouped by those decisions.  A second variable, piracy percentage, was also used in the analysis.  This
variable represented the  percentage of time periods in which the individual chose to pirate the software.
It is important to note that the experimental design made it impossible to test the entire path model, as in the survey method
above.  For the purposes of the experiment, PBC was rendered irrelevant.  All subjects were explicitly trained in how to pirate
the software in the experiment setting.  In effect, PBC was raised to a maximum as no controls were placed upon the
individual’s piracy behavior.  Therefore, it was not appropriate to measure this factor.  Also due to the fact that no controls were
placed on the individual, intent was not explicitly measured.  It was assumed that if an individual wished to pirate software
in the experiment, they would pirate the software.  There were no impediments to committing the piracy in the experiment
setting.  Finally, it should be noted that the measures of attitude and subjective norms represented the subject’s attitude and
subjective norms in his or her workplace and, therefore, would be affected by his or her perceptions of costs and benefits in
that setting, not necessarily the costs and benefits utilized in the experiment.  While these limitations made it impossible for
the experiment to test the entire path model, some interesting analyses could be undertaken on the data to further study the
relationships between the variables measured.  The following paragraphs detail that statistical analysis.
As pirate is a dichotomous variable, a P  analysis was used to test the relationship between pirate and the variables: punishment2
severity, punishment certainty, and s/w cost.  As the sample size was greater than twenty, Yate’s correction for continuity was
applied (Norusis 1988).  Each of the factors was found to have a significant relationship with pirate (see Table 5).
Table 5.  P Analyses of Experiment Data2 
(pirate=0 vs pirate=1)
Groups c N p2
punishment severity ($50, $250) 76.036 960 .000
punishment certainty (5%, 50%) 18.107 960 .000
s/w cost ($10, $30) 20.560 960 .000
Due to the nature of the data, a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out to study the effects of
punishment severity, punishment certainty, and s/w cost on the individual’s decision to pirate or not pirate in each time period.
A summary of the results can be found in Table 6.  As would be expected due to the nature of the data, the results were not
as strong as those found in the c  tests.  However, punishment severity was found to have a significant impact on pirate2
(p<.005).  While the results of the statistical tests involving punishment certainty and s/w cost were not significant, it appears
that a larger sample size would be likely to provide the additional power necessary to achieve significance.
Peace and Galletta
218
Table 6.  Repeated Measures ANOVA Analysis of Experiment Data
(pirate=0 vs pirate=1)
Variable N MS F value p
punishment severity ($50, $250) 48 16.54 9.42 (1,46) .004
punishment certainty (5%, 50%) 48 4.00 2.28 (1,46) .139
s/w cost ($10, $30) 48 4.54 2.49 (1,46) .116
Finally, the data were analyzed using the variable piracy percentage.  Correlation coefficients were calculated between piracy
percentage and the measures of attitude and subjective norms gained from the questionnaire.  As can be seen in Table 7, the
results were highly significant in each case.  A similar result was found between the variables moral obligation and attitude.
Due to the dichotomous nature of the variables punishment severity, punishment certainty, and s/w cost, T-tests were used to
analyze their relationships with the variable piracy percentage.  As expected, the results mirrored those found in the multiple
measures ANOVA analysis (see Table 8).  Indications of a relationship were found in each case, but the only highly significant
result was that found between punishment severity and piracy percentage.
Table 7.  Experiment Data Correlation Analyses
First Variable Second Variable r r N2
Moral Obligation Attitude .6081*** .3699 48
Attitude Piracy Percentage .3930** .1544 48
Subjective Norms Piracy Percentage .4174** .1742 48
   *** p<.0001   ** p<.001
Table 8.  Results of T-Test Analysis of Experimental Data
Variable Mean SD Mean SD df t-score p
   s/w cost = $10 $30
piracy percentage 24.17 25.57 37.92 37.44 46 -1.49 .144
   punishment certainty = 5% 50%
piracy percentage 37.50 35.02 24.58 29.00 46 1.39 .171
   punishment severity = $50 $250
piracy percentage 44.17 36.56 17.92 21.41 46 3.04 .004
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6. DISCUSSION
The data indicate that the model is a useful tool in analyzing the piracy decision.  In particular, the TPB structure appears to
be a good fit to the data.  Using the survey data, the path coefficients calculated between piracy intention and behavior, attitude
and piracy intention, PBC and piracy intention, and PBC and piracy behavior, were all found to be significant (p<.01).
Correlation coefficients between each of the pairs of variables were found to be strong and significant in all cases, indicating
relationships between the factors.  In the experiment, attitude and subjective norms were found to be significantly correlated
with the subject’s actual piracy behavior in the experimental setting.
When analyzing the predicted antecedents of the attitude factor, the results are not as strong.  While moral obligation was found
to have a strong effect on attitude in all statistical tests, the calculated path coefficients between attitude and punishment
severity, punishment certainty, and s/w cost were weak and non-significant, although the correlation analysis of the survey data
did provide significant support for the predicted relationships.  The analysis of the experiment data provided indications of a
relationship between the three economic factors and the subjects’ actual piracy behavior in the experimental setting.  The
repeated measures ANOVA provided particularly strong evidence of a relationship between the punishment severity and the
subjects’ decision to pirate.  Although no significant effects were detected between piracy behavior and the two variables
punishment certainty and s/w cost, it appears likely that an experiment with higher statistical power would be needed to support
the assertion that these two variables have an impact on piracy.  T-tests analyzing these factors and the percentage of decisions
made by each individual to pirate gave results very similar to the ANOVA analysis.  Chi-square analysis of the dichotomous
economic variables and the individual decisions to pirate or not pirate yielded more significant results (see Table 5).  Therefore,
this study provides strong evidence that  punishment severity is a factor in piracy decisions, and mixed evidence that punishment
certainty and s/w cost are factors in piracy decisions.
The identification of punishment certainty as a control belief affecting PBC is strongly supported by the data.  A strong and
significant correlation coefficient was identified between these two factors using the survey data, and a strong and significant
path coefficient was found in the LISREL analysis of the model.
7. IMPLICATIONS
This study has strong implications for both researchers studying piracy behavior and those groups attempting to stop it.  TPB
clearly is a useful tool in analyzing the decision to pirate and future research should focus on TPB as a framework.  For
practitioner groups, this implies that the factors identified by TPB, such as subjective norms, can be manipulated to yield the
desirable effects.  By creating an environment that promotes anti-piracy behavior among authority figures and peers, it may
be possible to affect the individual computer-user’s perceptions of subjective norms and, therefore, reduce the piracy behavior
of the individual.  To some extent, the Software Publishers Association (SPA) has attempted this course of action through their
many advertisements, brochures and promotions.
While punishment factors did not contribute greatly to the tested model, there is evidence that punishment can be a tool in the
fight against piracy.  Increasing the punishment severity and punishment certainty may lead to a decrease in piracy behavior.
However, it may be that, in reality, these factors are already significantly high.  Computer-users may simply perceive them
as being low.  By publicizing the actual levels of severity and certainty more clearly, it may be possible to increase people’s
perceptions of these factors and, therefore, reduce the intention to commit piracy.  Organizations that are intent on eliminating
piracy within their ranks should consider instituting (and publicizing) significant punishments.  Software that is available today
(such as that available from the SPA) makes it very easy to perform audits of hard disks.  This study indicates that creating and
maintaining an audit strategy may be a deterrent to piracy behavior.
8. CONCLUSION
This study refines and builds on the previous attempts to develop a predictive model of piracy behavior.  Previous research
identified the usefulness of TRA as a model in this area (e.g. Christensen and Eining 1993).  This study extends that model to
include the factor of perceived behavioral control, as posited by TPB.  The model also continues the process of decomposing
the TPB factors and identifying the belief variables that determine the main TPB factors.  While previous studies have begun
this process, this study advances the model.
Peace and Galletta
220
There is still much work to be done in this area.  While the data establish a link between punishment severity, punishment
certainty, s/w cost and the commitment of piracy, the model does not appear to adequately explain the contribution of these
items.  Future research must also focus on the belief factors that determine subjective norms.  While punishment certainty was
found to have a strong effect on PBC, there may be other control beliefs that could affect this construct.  Finally, it was
impossible to test any hypotheses involving attitudes toward computers in this study due to the validity concerns regarding the
ATCUS questionnaire.  Christensen and Eining’s call for more research into the effect of this factor is still appropriate.
Despite the calls of such prominent researchers as Richard Mason (1986), research in the area of software piracy has long been
conspicuous in its absence.  However, recent years have seen the development of a small research stream in the MIS literature.
A rich agenda lies ahead for investigators who wish to better understand the dynamics of piracy behavior and perhaps even
reduce the significant losses that continue to occur on a daily basis.
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